Introduction
With the European Monetary Union in operation since 1999, focus has shifted to other areas of the world, particularly Asia, to examine whether similar ventures might be viable or desirable there. 1 Policymakers are generally concerned about in ‡ation performance, possibly because a time inconsistency problem in monetary policymaking can cause an undesirable in ‡ation bias to persist. 2 If the future evolution of such in ‡ation preferences is uncertain, the decision to join a monetary union represents a real option due to policymakers'reluctance to commit to a largely irreversible move that could later prove less advantageous than initially thought. 1 See e.g. Eichengreen/Bayoumi (1999) . 2 See e.g. Barro/Gordon (1983) . 3 See e.g. Dixit/Pindyck (1994 In this paper we extend and apply the theoretical model of Strobel (2002 Strobel ( , 2005 in examining this real option implicit in countries'decisions of whether to join a monetary union when the costs of later leaving it again are considered prohibitively high and there is uncertainty over the future bene…ts of such a move. We calibrate our model for the core ASEAN/AFTA countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand by proxying policymakers' stochastic in ‡ation biases with unemployment rates, derive the proxied trigger values of relative in ‡ation bias parameters for di¤erent time horizons and contrast them with the corresponding actual ratios for 2003, our reference period. We …nd that none of the countries considered would be prepared to join a monetary union amongst them at present, most of them have low to negligible probabilities of ever wanting to do so, whilst also not expecting that event to occur in …nite time. Those countries thus appear too heterogenous and variable at the moment to make formation of a monetary union much of a realistic prospect in the near future.
Section 2 now presents the model; the results of our calibration exercise are reported in section 3, and section 4 concludes the paper.
The model
Policymakers in countries c and the potential wider union u are assumed to be exclusively concerned with in ‡ation performance; they face instantaneous loss rates l it = it , where exogenous in ‡ation biases it 0 follow geometric Brownian motions
with i > 0 , dz it = " it p dt are increments of Wiener processes with " it NID(0; 1) , and E t (dz ct dz ut ) = dt with the coe¢ cient of correlation between the processes z it (and 1 < 1). The expected present discounted value of losses associated with in ‡ation performance is then 5 4 Similar frameworks are used in Strobel (2002 Strobel ( , 2005 
where > 0 is the (possibly subjective) discount rate. The decision of a country c on whether or not to join the wider monetary union u then involves solving the Bellman equation for the optimal stopping problem
where F (L c ; L u ) is the value to country c of the option of joining the wider monetary union u , and L c L u is the expected discounted bene…t of such a move when any other cost/bene…ts are abstracted from. 6 Note that this implicitly assumes that joining a monetary union is an irreversible process, so that the costs of possibly later leaving it again are considered prohibitively high. We can then obtain 
Otherwise it will keep the option unexercised, with expected time and probability of future exercise of
We drop time subscripts for ease of notation. ; intuitively, the higher a country's in ‡ation bias relative to the potential wider union's, the more it stands to gain from giving up its monetary independence. While applies, on the other hand, country c strictly prefers to leave the option of monetary integration unexercised and remains outside the wider union for the time being; in this case, we can further derive the expected time and probability of its potential future exercise of that option.
A simple calibration
We proceed to calibrate the model in Section 2 for the core ASEAN/AFTA countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand by proxying national policymakers'inherent in ‡ation biases c with unemployment rates; this re ‡ects the familiar rationale for the potential bene…ts of surprise in ‡ation based on the expectational Phillips curve. ) to re ‡ect our distributional assumption of eq. (1); these are reported in Table 1 . The potential monetary union's in ‡ation bias u is for these purposes constructed as the simple arithmetic mean of the constituent countries'proxied values; this mimics a bargaining outcome over the union's monetary policy where individual member countries have equal votes.
The proxied trigger values of relative in ‡ation bias parameters u c , from Proposition 1, are then computed for time horizons of 10 and 25 years by applying discount rates of 12.5% and 5.5%, respectively, to allow for varying degrees of policymakers' myopia. 9 These results, together with the proxied Tables 2 and 3 both for a potential monetary union comprising all …ve countries (All) as well as a narrower one (MST) consisting only of Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand (the low-unemployment group in our reference period). Table 4 then gives the expected times and probabilities, from the second part of Proposition 1, of the option of monetary integration potentially being exercised at some point in the future for those di¤erent constellations.
From Table 2 we observe that none of the countries considered would be prepared to join a monetary union comprising the whole group at present, irrespective of time horizon. Table 4 further indicates that, apart from the Philippines which has expected joining times hundreds of years above the discount rate of 2.5% over those …nite time horizons. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 time horizon, none of them ever expects wanting to do so. Malaysia and Indonesia have otherwise the highest probabilities of ever wanting to join a monetary union comprising the whole group, while those probabilities are negligible for Singapore and Thailand, particularly for the longer time horizon where uncertainty leads to signi…cantly more cautious behavior. We observe similar results for the sub-group of Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand: Table 3 shows that none of them would be prepared to join a narrow monetary union between them at present either, irrespective of time horizon. While Malaysia expects future joining dates that lie only very substantially above the time horizons considered, Singapore and Thailand never expect wanting to join at all, and it is then only Singapore for the 10 year horizon that has a non-negligible probability of ever wanting to be part of such a union.
To sum up the results of our simple calibrations: the …ve ASEAN/AFTA 6 Page 6 of 9
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 F o r P e e r R e v i e w countries considered appear at present too heterogenous and variable to make formation of a monetary union amongst them much of a realistic prospect in the near future, as the value of waiting associated with such a major regime shift proves rather substantial for the criteria considered.
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Conclusion
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